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CHALLENGING THE EXCLUSION OF
GAMBLING DISORDER AS A
DISABILITY UNDER THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
KATHLEEN V. WADE†
ABSTRACT
The Americans with Disabilities Act explicitly excludes
“compulsive gambling” from its definition of disability, thus denying
gambling addicts protection from employer discrimination based on
their disorder. Since the enactment of the ADA, however, scientific
understandings of gambling disorder have evolved to view the
condition as an addiction, rather than as a compulsion or impulsecontrol disorder. This move is mirrored in the DSM-5’s
reclassification of gambling disorder under the category of
“substance-related and other addictive disorders.”
This Note contends that gambling disorder would qualify as a
“disability” under the ADA, were it not for the disorder’s current
statutory exclusion. This Note therefore recommends that the ADA be
amended to bring gambling disorder within its coverage. Such a
change would not only reflect recent developments in the field of
addiction psychology, but would also further the ADA’s underlying
purpose—to protect individuals with disabilities from workplace
discrimination.

INTRODUCTION
By 2005, John Trammell was $30,000 in debt to the Las Vegas
1
Stardust Hotel and Casino. Although he “had gambled all his life,”
Trammell’s habits grew more pronounced and “aggressive[]” as his
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marriage ended and his depression worsened. In 2007, while
investigating a serious car accident involving Trammel, Arizona
police discovered a warrant for Trammel’s arrest arising from his
3
unpaid debts to the Stardust. At the time, Trammell was employed as
a senior manager by the Raytheon Company, an American defense
4
contractor and weapons manufacturer. When he returned to work
after his arrest, Trammell met with Raytheon’s human-resources
5
department to discuss his gambling problem. Initially, Raytheon’s
human-resources personnel offered Trammell professional
6
counseling. At a meeting just a few days later, Raytheon fired
7
Trammell despite his expressed willingness to seek help.
John Trammell’s story is not unique; he is only one of an
estimated six to eight million Americans with problematic gambling
8
habits. Whether they wager on roulette, horse races, or lottery
9
scratch cards, “problem gamblers” are individuals whose betting
10
habits cause disruptions in their lives. When problematic gambling
habits become “persistent and recurrent” and “lead[] to clinically
significant impairment or distress,” they rise to the level of “gambling
disorder,” a diagnosable addiction listed in the most recent edition of
11
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-5).

2. Trammell v. Raytheon Missile Sys., 721 F. Supp. 2d 876, 876–77 (D. Ariz. 2010).
3. Id. at 877.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See Help & Treatment FAQ, NAT’L COUNCIL ON PROBLEM GAMBLING,
http://www.ncpgambling.org/help-treatment/faq (last visited Jan. 23, 2015) (estimating
populations of four to six million adults with problematic gambling habits and another two
million adults whose gambling patterns are sufficiently severe to meet the criteria for
pathological gambling disorder). For autobiographical accounts of other gambling addicts, see
SAM SKOLNIK, HIGH STAKES: THE RISING COST OF AMERICA’S GAMBLING ADDICTION i–xxvi
(2011); see generally MARY SOJOURNER, SHE BETS HER LIFE: A TRUE STORY OF GAMBLING
ADDICTION (2010).
9. The meaning of “gambling,” as used in this Note, generally adheres to a broad range of
any activities in which money is risked. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 793 (10th ed. 2014)
(defining gambling as “[t]he act of risking something of value, esp. money, for a chance to win a
prize”).
10. Help & Treatment FAQ, supra note 8.
11. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 585 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-5]. Although previous editions of the DSM
had been enumerated with Roman numerals, the switch to Arabic numbers in the fifth edition
was a deliberate move by the American Psychiatric Association (APA) to allow for incremental
updates to the manual to be designated with decimals. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, Frequently
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Just as Trammell saw a significant increase in the frequency of
his gambling during a period of stress, people with gambling disorder
often use betting as a way to cope with negative feelings of stress,
12
anxiety, guilt, and depression. Continued reliance on gambling as a
coping mechanism can magnify the addiction: once a preoccupation
with gambling places a strain on a person’s finances, relationships, or
job, the stress resulting from that strain may drive that person to
13
gamble even more frequently. In fact, excessive-gambling behavior
is associated with higher rates of divorce, bankruptcy, homelessness,
14
and suicide. Due to the circular nature of gambling addicts’
dependence, efforts by gambling addicts to quit or reduce their
gambling often prove unsuccessful, leaving the gamblers, like
15
Trammell, out of luck.
The individual gambler is not the only person harmed by
gambling disorder. Gambling addictions also impose large costs on
16
society. According to a 2004 calculation, the estimated social costs
associated with gambling in the United States range from $32.4 billion

Asked Questions, DSM-5 DEV., http://www.dsm5.org/about/Pages/faq.aspx (last visited Jan. 23,
2015).
12. See Brian Castellani, Is Pathological Gambling Really a Problem? You Bet!,
PSYCHIATRIC TIMES, (Feb. 1, 2001), available at http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/articles/
pathological-gambling-really-problem-you-bet (“Gambling becomes a coping mechanism, a way
of dealing with the world. For these people, gambling provides an opportunity to ‘be in action,’
‘numb out’ and escape their problems.”); Richard A. McCormick, The Importance of Coping
Skill Enhancement in the Treatment of the Pathological Gambler, 10 J. GAMBLING STUD. 77, 78
(1994) (discussing gambling as “an escape avoidance coping response” to a triggering event that
produces “sadness, frustration and perhaps anxiety”).
13. See Castellani, supra note 12 (noting that problem gamblers “get trapped in a vicious
cycle of gambling to cope and coping to gamble. Now, not only are they suffering from the
problems that started them gambling in the first place . . . , but they are also dealing with the
negative consequences of their gambling”).
14. NAT’L COUNCIL ON PROBLEM GAMBLING, PROBLEM GAMBLERS AND THEIR
FINANCES 6 (2000), available at http://www.ncpgambling.org/files/public/problem_gamblers_
finances.pdf.
15. See Gambling Disorders Fact Sheet, AM. GAMING ASS’N, http://www.americangaming
.org/industry-resources/research/fact-sheets/gambling-disorders (last visited Jan. 23, 2015)
(estimating that two-thirds of gambling addicts are unable to recover without seeking or
accepting formal treatment).
16. Looking solely at illicit drug, alcohol, and tobacco addictions, addictions cost society
over $500 billion annually. Addiction Science: From Molecules to Managed Care, NAT’L INST.
ON DRUG ABUSE, http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/addiction-science-molecules-tomanaged-care/introduction/drug-abuse-costs-united-states-economy-hundreds-billions-dollarsin-increased-health (last updated July, 2008).
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to $53.8 billion annually. A portion of this can be directly attributed
18
to problematic gambling habits. Gambling addictions result in a less
productive workforce—gambling addicts frequently lose their jobs,
and employed gambling addicts are more often absent from work
19
than their unafflicted peers. Gambling addictions also burden socialservices systems through unemployment, put social and financial
pressure on the addicts’ families, and increase the rates of certain
20
crimes. These high costs demonstrate that society has a strong
interest in rehabilitating individuals with gambling disorder.
But controversy may arise when gambling addicts’ attempts to
receive treatment for their condition come into conflict with their
employment obligations. The inpatient and residential treatment
programs recommended to many gambling addicts require substantial
21
time spent away from work. Group-therapy meetings like Gamblers
22
Anonymous may require flexible work scheduling. Aside from
scheduling difficulties, gambling addicts may be reluctant to reveal
their problems at work, fearing a potential backlash from their
employers and fellow employees. When individuals with other
addictive disorders face these difficulties, the Americans with
23
Disabilities Act (ADA) offers them protections.
After losing his job, John Trammell sued his employer for
24
wrongful termination under the ADA. In his complaint, Trammell
25
claimed depression as a disability, but made no attempt to claim his
17. EARL L. GRINOLS, GAMBLING IN AMERICA: COSTS AND BENEFITS 176 (2004). These
social costs outweigh the benefits of the gambling industry “by a factor of about 3 to 1.” Earl L.
Grinols, Too Many Negative Side Effects to Online Gambling, N.Y. TIMES (July 29,
2010, 3:28 P.M.), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2010/07/29/should-internet-gamblingbe-legalized/too-many-negative-side-effects-to-online-gambling.
18. See generally Douglas M. Walker & A.H. Barnett, The Social Costs of Gambling: An
Economic Perspective, 15 J. GAMBLING STUD. 181 (1999) (aggregating several different
estimates of the social costs imposed by pathological gamblers).
19. GRINOLS, supra note 17, at 176.
20. Id.
21. See HANDBOOK OF ADDICTIVE DISORDERS 182–86 (Robert H. Coombs ed., 2004)
(discussing the risks and benefits of inpatient treatment for gambling problems and the
circumstances that require inpatient treatment).
22. Gamblers Anonymous meetings are frequently scheduled in the evenings and on
weekends to accommodate traditional work schedules. However, not all gambling addicts will
have traditional work schedules. See U.S. Meetings, GAMBLERS ANONYMOUS, http://www
.gamblersanonymous.org/ga/locations (last visited Jan. 23, 2015).
23. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012).
24. Complaint at 4, Trammell v. Raytheon Missile Sys., 721 F. Supp. 2d 876 (D. Ariz. 2010)
(No. 4:08-cv-338).
25. Id. at 2.
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26

gambling disorder as a disability even though he had received a
27
formal diagnosis of pathological gambling in September 2007. This
glaring gap in his pleadings likely did not result from an oversight, but
reflects the reality that such a claim is currently untenable because the
ADA explicitly excludes “compulsive gambling” from its definition of
28
disability. Even though Trammell’s employer had knowledge of his
gambling problems, because he had no provable knowledge of his
depression, Trammell could not establish a prima facie case for
29
discrimination. Therefore, his claim failed at the summary-judgment
30
stage.
In the twenty-four years since the enactment of the ADA, the
scientific understanding of excessive gambling as a mental disorder
has greatly evolved. Changes in its name and psychiatric classification
mirror a new understanding that excessive gambling can be viewed as
31
an addiction, instead of a compulsion. This is not merely a difference
of semantics, but a significant alteration in how clinicians understand
the manifestation and persistence of excessive-gambling habits as a
mental disorder. Therefore, although the language of the ADA
32
specifically refers to “compulsive gambling,” and many older sources
33
refer to “pathological gambling,” this Note will use the modern
diagnostic language of “gambling disorder” and “gambling
addiction,” and will refer to individuals with a gambling disorder as
“gambling addicts.” The terms “problem gambling” and “excessive
gambling” used in this Note refer to a broader spectrum of gambling
behaviors that encompasses, but is not limited to, full-blown gambling
34
disorder.

26. See id. at 2–4 (alleging depression, mental illness, emotional distress, anxiety, and
stress, but not problem gambling).
27. Affidavit of Bradley R. Johnson, M.D. at 2, Trammell, 721 F. Supp. 2d 876 (No. 4:08-cv338).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(2) (2012).
29. Trammell, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 882–83.
30. Id.
31. For a discussion of the evolving scientific understanding of gambling disorder, see infra
Part II.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 12211.
33. See generally CHRISTINE REILLY & NATHAN SMITH, THE EVOLVING DEFINITION OF
PATHOLOGICAL GAMBLING IN THE DSM-5 (2013), available at http://www.ncrg.org/sites/
default/files/uploads/docs/white_papers/ncrg_wpdsm5_may2013.pdf (discussing the shift in
preferred nomenclature for gambling disorder).
34. See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text.
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Despite the changes to the scientific understanding of excessivegambling behaviors, the ADA’s exclusion of compulsive gambling
remains the law. This exclusion deprives individuals with gambling
disorder of the same protections that the ADA affords to individuals
with psychiatrically similar addictions like alcoholism and drug
35
dependency. Because the ADA’s definition of disability serves a
gatekeeping role in courts’ determination of disability-discrimination
claims, this Note calls for an amendment to the ADA eliminating the
exclusion of compulsive gambling.
This Note proceeds in five parts. Part I provides a summary of
the provisions and history of the ADA. Part II details the
psychological underpinnings of addiction theory and recent
developments in the psychiatric and psychological research of
excessive-gambling behaviors. Part III discusses problems with the
exclusion of compulsive gambling as a legally cognizable disability
under the ADA. Part IV addresses potential challenges to recognition
of addictive-gambling disorder as a disability. Part V analyzes how
John Trammel’s case would have been decided if the ADA had
allowed a gambling-based disability. This Note concludes by
advocating for an amendment to the ADA to remove the current
exclusion of compulsive gambling and to allow for the recognition of
addictive-gambling disorder as a disability.
I. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
A. The ADA’s Enactment and Purpose
36

Congress enacted the ADA in 1990 to eliminate discrimination
37
against individuals with disabilities. Although the Rehabilitation
38
Act had been passed previously to prohibit discrimination on the
basis of disability in the employment practices of federal agencies and
certain federal contractors, the ADA expanded these protections into
the private arena. Lawmakers were focused on the “isolate[d]” and

35. See infra Part III.C.
36. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012)). Despite the fanfare accompanying its passage,
the ADA was not the first piece of federal legislation intended to protect the rights of people
with disabilities. See, e.g., Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–796 (2012) (prohibiting
federal agencies, federal contractors, and recipients of federal funds from discriminating against
people with disabilities).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2012).
38. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–796 (2012).
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“segregate[d]” social positions occupied by people with disabilities
that cause them to be “severely disadvantaged socially, vocationally,
39
economically, and educationally.” In light of the lawmakers’ voiced
rationale, the ADA was touted as an “emancipation proclamation for
40
the disabled.”
One of the driving goals behind the legislation was to combat the
“barriers of ignorance, prejudice, and inaccessibility” that prevent
41
people with disabilities from entering the labor pool. To this end,
42
Title I of the ADA establishes rules for employers’ treatment of
individuals with disabilities that “make it possible for [them] to lead
43
productive lives.” Title I prohibits covered employers from
44
discriminating against “qualified individuals” on the basis of
45
disability. The provisions of Title I not only limit the scope of
allowable employer actions, but also impose an affirmative obligation
on employers to provide “reasonable accommodations” to employees
46
with disabilities. This reasonable-accommodation requirement was
intended to create employment opportunities that would have been

39. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2), (6) (2012).
40. 135 CONG. REC. 19,888 (1989) (statement of Sen. Kennedy); see also 136 CONG. REC.
17,369 (1990) (statement of Sen. Harkin) (arguing that the ADA is “an emancipation
proclamation for persons with disabilities”).
41. 135 CONG. REC. H5065 (1989) (statement of Rep. Hoyer). This goal was not purely
rights-focused, but also financially motivated. See id. (“[T]he Federal Government currently
spends up to $75 billion . . . much of the money being spent supporting people who want to
work.”).
42. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–12117 (2012).
43. 135 CONG. REC. H5065 (2007) (statement of Rep. Hoyer).
44. “Qualified individual” is defined as “an individual who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions” of his desired job. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The statute provides: “No covered entity shall discriminate
against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures,
the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and
other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” Id.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). Examples of “reasonable accommodations” include
adjustments to existing facilities to make them accessible and usable, modified work schedules,
reassignment, and adjustment of training material or policies. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9). The
affirmative obligation to provide reasonable accommodation distinguishes the ADA from other
employment-discrimination statutes, with the exception of Title VII’s prohibition of
discrimination based on religion. Compare id. (providing a list of accommodations that
employers can make for individuals with disability that fall within the definition of “reasonable
accommodation”), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012) (allowing employers to claim that they are
“unable to reasonably accommodate an employee’s religious observance and practice” without
“undue hardship on the . . . employer’s business”).
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otherwise unavailable to individuals with disabilities and to facilitate
the productivity of employed individuals with disabilities by tailoring
48
work environments to their needs.
B. Establishing a Disability and Bringing a Claim Under the ADA
The ADA’s definition of disability plays a critical gatekeeping
role in determining the scope of Title I’s protection. Before seeking
any remedy for adverse employment actions under the ADA,
individuals must first establish that they are covered under the Act by
alleging that they have a recognized disability. Lawmakers decided
against the creation of any conditions that would automatically
49
qualify as disabilities under the ADA, so courts must examine claims
50
of disability on a case-by-case basis. Under the ADA, claimants
must establish a disability by satisfying one of three conditions: first,
alleging “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one
51
or more major life activities of such individual;” second,
52
demonstrating “a record of such an impairment;” or third, “being

47. See 135 CONG. REC. S10,713 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Harkin) (“The
ADA gives power to individuals with disabilities to make choices, to decide for themselves what
kind of life they want to lead, and provides a meaningful and effective opportunity to become
independent and productive members of our society.”).
48. See, e.g., 154 CONG. REC. 19,436 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 2008) (statement of Rep. Rob
Andrews) (“There was a man who got a job with a major retail corporation . . . , and he’s
diabetic. When he first started work, his supervisor understood that . . . he needed a special
lunch break . . . so he could deal with his blood sugar needs and stay healthy and be
productive.”).
49. See S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 20 (1989) (“It is not possible to include . . . all the specific
conditions . . . that would constitute physical or mental impairments . . . , particularly in light of
the fact that new disorders may develop in the future.”). More recently, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) revised its proposed regulations, which had originally
included a list of impairments that would “consistently,” “sometimes,” or “usually not”
constitute disabilities under the ADA, in response to criticism that the list would effectively
create per se disabilities. Fact Sheet on the EEOC’s Final Regulations Implementing the
ADAAA, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/regulations/
adaaa_fact_sheet.cfm (last visited Jan. 23, 2015). However, the list did include a select group of
conditions that “virtually always constitute a disability,” like HIV, cancer, and diabetes. Id.
50. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 641–42 (1998) (deciding not to address the
second question presented of whether HIV is a per se disability under the ADA).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2012).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(B). The second “record of” prong applies when an individual “has
a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(1) (2015).
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53

regarded as having such an impairment.” This Note focuses on the
54
first (or “actual disability”) prong, and how both Congress and the
courts have shaped its terms. Though the disability requirement is
only one of the many hurdles prospective plaintiffs must clear, the
definition of disability is one area where courts exercise great control
over the scope of the ADA’s protections by drawing the boundary
55
Therefore, the threshold disability
lines of this provision.
requirement has often proved to be the determinative factor in many
employees’ claims for relief.
The “actual disability” prong encompasses both physical and
56
mental impairments. Physical impairments can range from “cosmetic
disfigurement” to physiological disorders affecting multiple body
57
systems, and “[a]ny mental or psychological disorder”—including
learning disabilities and mental illnesses—can qualify as a mental
58
impairment. An impairment alone, however, is not sufficient to
establish a disability, unless it also “substantially limit[s] a major life
59
activity.” The ADA defines major life activities to include not only
“caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating,
sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing,

53. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C). The third “regarded as” prong addresses employer
perceptions of disability. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l). A person falls under the third prong of disability
if her employer treats her as having an impairment, even if she does not. Id.
54. Although the ADA’s implementing regulations refer to conditions that satisfy the first
prong of the ADA’s definition of disability as “actual” disabilities, that terminology was
selected for ease of reference. Individuals with conditions meeting any of the three prongs are
equally protected under the ADA. Regulations To Implement the Equal Employment
Provisions of the Americans With Disabilities Act, as Amended, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,978 (proposed
Mar. 25, 2011) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630 (2015)).
55. For an example of how courts may narrow the scope of the ADA, consider the series of
cases—now largely defunct—incorporating mitigating measures into courts’ determinations of
disabilities. See Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565 (1999) (recognizing visual
compensation as a mitigating measure for monocular vision), and Murphy v. United Parcel
Serv., 527 U.S. 516, 521 (1999) (recognizing medication as a mitigating measure for blood
pressure); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 488–89 (1999) (recognizing glasses as a
mitigating measure for myopia). For an example of boundary enlarging, see Bragdon, 524 U.S.
at 641 (holding that asymptomatic HIV infection is a disability); see also Kevin Barry, Toward
Universalism: What the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 Can and Can’t Do for Disability Rights,
31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 203, 206 (2010) (“The story of lower courts striking down the
claims of people with significant medical impairments under the [ADA] because they are not
‘disabled’ is a familiar one in legal scholarship.”).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A).
57. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) (2015).
58. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A).
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learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and
60
working” but also maintaining “major bodily functions.”
Consider a woman with a form of muscular dystrophy who has
lost the use of her legs and thus requires the use of a wheelchair.
Although her use of a wheelchair alone does not establish that she
has a disability within the meaning of the ADA, courts applying the
ADA would almost certainly recognize the woman’s physical
condition as a disability because muscular dystrophy is a physical
impairment affecting her muscular system, and her impairment
61
substantially limits a major life activity—namely, her ability to walk.
The ADA’s definition of disability is not limited to physical
conditions, but also explicitly states that mental impairments can
62
qualify as disabilities. A number of cases have recognized
depression, generalized-anxiety disorder, and other mental conditions
63
as disabilities. Among the potentially covered mental impairments
contemplated by lawmakers at the time the ADA was passed,
alcoholism and drug addiction were openly discussed and included in
64
the statutory language. The legislative discussion and statutory
inclusion support the contention that they meet the requirements of a
disability. Even though both conditions qualify under the ADA,
Congress has noted that both substance-abuse disorders are subject to
65
special restrictions.

60. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)–(B).
61. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A); see EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES, NO. 915.002, at 2–3 (1997) (listing as
examples of emotional or mental illness “major depression, bipolar disorder, [and] anxiety
disorders”).
63. See, e.g., Whalen v. City of Syracuse, No. 5:11-cv-794, 2014 WL 3529976, at *6
(N.D.N.Y. July 15, 2014) (“Here, Plaintiff’s anxiety and depression clearly satisfy the actual
disability prong under the ADAAA.”); Owens v. City of Barnsdell, No. 13-cv-749, 2014 WL
2197798, at *3 (N.D. Okla. May 27, 2014) (finding it “plausible that Plaintiff’s depression and
anxiety could limit a major life activity”); Cody v. Cnty. Nassau, 577 F. Supp. 2d 623, 638
(E.D.N.Y. 2008) (acknowledging that generalized-anxiety disorder has been recognized as an
impairment under the ADA (citing Reeves v. Johnson Controls, 140 F.3d 298, 312 (2d Cir.
1999))).
64. See, e.g., 135 CONG. REC. S19,900 (1989) (emphasizing Congressional intent “to protect
applicants and employees who have overcome or are successfully being treated for drug or
alcohol problems.”); S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 20–21 (1989) (“The term [mental impairment]
includes . . . drug addiction and alcoholism.”).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 12114 (2012). For a discussion of these special restrictions, see infra Part
IV.B.
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Although the ADA does not designate any conditions as per se
66
disabilities, it does include several per se exclusions of conditions as
recognized disabilities. In 42 U.S.C. § 12211, the ADA specifically
excludes from coverage compulsive gambling as well as
homosexuality, bisexuality, transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia,
exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender-identity disorders, other sexualbehavior disorders, kleptomania, pyromania, and psychoactive67
substance-abuse disorders resulting from the illegal use of drugs.
Commenting on the potential inclusion of conditions like compulsive
gambling in the ADA’s coverage, one senator argued:
A diagnosis of certain types of mental illness is frequently made on
the basis of a pattern of socially unacceptable behavior and lacks
any physiological basis. In short, we are talking about behavior that
is immoral, improper, or illegal and which individuals are engaging
in of their own volition, admittedly for reasons we do not fully
understand. . . . In principle, I agree with the concept that the
mentally ill should be protected from invidious discrimination just as
the physically handicapped should be. However, people must bear
68
some responsibility for the consequences of their own actions.

The above commentary and others like it evidence the moralistic
69
nature of § 12211’s exclusions, colloquially referred to as the “sin
70
exceptions.”
Due to the exclusion of compulsive gambling, an employee is
unable to seek protection from unlawful termination and cannot
request workplace accommodations under the ADA on the basis of
his gambling condition. This is true regardless of whether the

66. See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 12211 (2012). This Note’s argument to legitimize gambling disorder as a
disability does not extend to all other items listed in § 12211. In fact, to characterize those listed
items bearing on sexual orientation and gender identity as “disabilities” would be not only
inaccurate, but offensive. However, their reference in the statutory language reflects the
moralistic undertone of the § 12211 exclusions. For further discussion of the ADA’s treatment
of sexual and gender identity, see generally Kevin M. Barry, Disabilityqueer: Federal Disability
Rights Protection for Transgender People, 16 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1 (2013).
68. 135 CONG. REC. S19,896 (1989).
69. See 135 CONG. REC. S19,853 (1989) (“I could not imagine the sponsors would want to
provide a protected legal status to somebody who has such [mental] disorders, particularly those
[that] might have a moral content to them or which in the opinion of some people might have a
moral content.”).
70. Zachary Busey, Breaking Brackets: Is Gambling on March Madness Illegal?, BAKER
DONELSON (Mar. 25, 2014, 1:49 PM), http://www.bakerdonelson.com/l_e_compass/blog.aspx?
entry=482.
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employee can demonstrate that his gambling condition would
otherwise qualify under the ADA criteria as a mental impairment
that substantially limits a major life activity and that he is, with or
without reasonable accommodation, qualified for the job. Section
12211 effectively bars any argument that compulsive gambling could
be recognized by a court as a disability under the ADA. Although an
argument could conceivably be made that compulsive gambling and
71
gambling disorder are two different conditions, thereby removing
gambling disorder from the realm of § 12211, present and historical
usage of “compulsive gambling” as an equivalent for gambling
72
disorder would likely render this argument unsuccessful.
II. GAMBLING AS AN ADDICTIVE BEHAVIOR
This Part explains the development of the current scientific
understanding of gambling as an addictive behavior. This Part first
presents the idea of behavioral addictions in general, and then tracks
how gambling disorder came to be considered a behavioral addiction
through the various editions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders. Lastly, this Part examines how gambling
disorder comports with a current understanding of addiction.
A. The Idea of Behavioral Addictions
The concept of addiction is particularly nebulous. Despite the
73
term’s long lineage, there is still no medical or legal consensus on
74
what it means to be addicted. The Black’s Law Dictionary definition
of addiction adheres to the traditional substance-based notion of
75
addiction, but the increasingly accepted view considers substance-

71. For a discussion of the shift in DSM-5 classification that distances gambling disorder
from compulsive gambling, see infra Part II.B.
72. E.g., Diseases and Conditions: Compulsive Gambling, MAYO CLINIC, http://
www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/compulsive-gambling/basics/definition/con-20023242
(last visited Jan. 23, 2015) (“Compulsive gambling, also called gambling disorder . . . .”).
73. The term “addiction” was used to reference the state of being dependent on a drug as
early as 1779. Addiction, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 143 (2d ed. 1989).
74. Definitions Related to the Use of Opioids for the Treatment of Pain, AM. PAIN SOC’Y 1
(2001), available at https://www.erowid.org/psychoactives/addiction/addiction_definitions1.pdf
(“Scientists, clinicians, regulators, and the lay public use disparate definitions of terms related to
addiction.”) For example, because the above source focuses on opioid abuse, the definition of
addiction it recommends focuses on “impaired control over drug use.” Id. at 2.
75. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 43 (9th ed. 2009) (defining addiction as “[t]he habitual and
intemperate use of a substance, esp. a potentially harmful one such as a narcotic drug.”).
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based addictions as only one subclass of a broader field, which now
77
includes gambling-based addictions.
Specifically, gambling disorder is part of a growing group of
behavioral addictions—addictions based on an individual’s
78
dependence on certain activities rather than on certain substances.
As with alcoholics or drug addicts, individuals with behavioral
addictions often begin their activity of choice voluntarily, but as the
addicts repeatedly engage in the behavior associated with the activity,
they experience biological, psychological, and behavioral changes that
form an addiction to the behavior, thereby inhibiting them from
79
stopping. Because behavioral addiction and traditional addiction are
distinguished principally by the absence of an external chemical, some
have called behavioral addictions like gambling disorder “pure
80
addiction[s].”

76. JIM ORFORD, AN UNSAFE BET? 45 (2011).
77. Id.
78. Although other “behavioral addictions” have been identified and studied, this Note is
arguing only for the inclusion of gambling disorder in the ADA’s coverage because gambling
disorder is the only carve-out with enough scientific research to solidly support its classification
as an addictive disorder. See DSM-5, supra note 11, at 481 (“Other excessive behavioral patterns
. . . have also been described, but the research on these and other behavioral syndromes is less
clear. Thus [other behavioral addictions] are not included [in DSM-5] because . . . there is
insufficient peer-reviewed evidence to establish the diagnostic criteria and course descriptions
needed to identify these . . . as mental disorders.”). Additionally, this Note will not address
whether any of the other items listed in § 12211, or any of the other conditions listed in the
DSM-IV’s “impulse-control disorders not otherwise classified” category, should be considered
behavioral disorders. See Jon E. Grant, Marc N. Potenza, Aviv Weinstein & David A. Gorelick,
Introduction to Behavioral Addictions, 36 AM. J. DRUG & ALCOHOL ABUSE 233, 233–34 (2010)
(“Not all impulse control disorders, or disorders characterized by impulsivity, should be
considered behavioral addictions.”). Ultimately, this Note neither supports nor forecloses the
future possibility of other conditions excluded under § 12211 entering ADA coverage.
79. See Alan I. Leshner, Addiction is a Brain Disease, 17 ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH. ONLINE
75, 76 (2001) (“[T]he recognition that addiction is a brain disease . . . explain[s] why an addict
cannot simply stop using drugs by sheer force of will alone.”).
80. Joseph W. Ciarrochi, Neil M. Kirschner & Fred Fallik, Personality Dimensions of Male
Pathological Gamblers, Alcoholics, and Dually Addicted Gamblers, 7 J. GAMBLING STUD. 133,
134 (1991); see PETER FERENTZY & NIGEL E. TURNER, THE HISTORY OF PROBLEM
GAMBLING 37 (2013) (noting that the phrase “pure addiction” is used “because of the absence
of a potentially harmful substance or any brain damage that might occur from the drug,” and
that “the changes seen in a person [with gambling addiction] are the result of the addiction and
not a side effect of the substance itself”); Alex Blaszczynski & Lia Nower, Research and
Measurement Issues in Gambling Studies: Etiological Models, in RESEARCH AND
MEASUREMENT ISSUES IN GAMBLING STUDIES 323, 335 (Garry Smith, David C. Hodgins &
Robert J. Williams eds., 2007) (noting that gambling addiction is “an addiction without [a]
drug”).
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B. The Treatment of Excessive Gambling as a Mental Disorder in the
DSM
1. Gambling as an Impulse-Control Disorder in DSM-III and
DSM-IV. The act of gambling has not always been considered an
81
addictive behavior. In fact, excessive gambling was more likely
considered to fall outside the realm of behaviors that could be
82
attributed to mental disorders.
The scientific community
significantly changed its approach toward recognizing excessive
gambling as a potential mental disorder in 1980 when pathological
83
gambling was listed in DSM-III as an “impulse control disorder.”
This inclusion spurred a sudden growth in the amount of scientific
research on gambling disorder and introduced the issue to the general
84
public.
Even after pathological gambling was first listed as a disorder in
the DSM-III, academics continued to debate whether the disorder
should be designated as an impulse-control disorder or as an

81. See ALAN F. COLLINS, The Pathological Gamblers and the Government of Gambling, in
THE SOCIOLOGY OF RISK AND GAMBLING READER 355, 355 (James F. Cosgrove ed., 2006)
(“One does not have to look back far for the picture to be very different: in the psychiatric and
psychological writings of the 1970s . . . and before, the pathological gambler was a rare figure
and one almost always denied the recognition afforded by an entry in the nosologies of mental
illness.”).
82. Id.
83. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter DSM-III]. The DSM plays a significant role in dictating
the academically accepted list of mental disorders. See Douglas A. Hass, Could the American
Psychiatric Association Cause You Headaches? The Dangerous Interaction Between the DSM-5
and Employment Law, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 683 (2013) (“[The DSM] has long served as the
primary reference for mental health disorders not only for medical practitioners, but also for
state and federal courts and government agencies like the Social Security Administration and
Veterans Administration.”).
84. See Henry R. Lesieur & Richard J. Rosenthal, Pathological Gambling: A Review of the
Literature, 7 J. GAMBLING STUD. 5, 6 (1991) (“The 1980s have produced a burgeoning of
interest in research into compulsive gambling.”). For a discussion of some of the earlier
research, see John B. Murray, Review of Research on Pathological Gambling, 72 PSYCHOL. REP.
791, 803 (1993) (noting that “the term pathological gambler took on definite meaning only
recently through the DSM-III” and that “studies of pathological gambling, especially those that
put compulsive gambling together with alcoholism and substance abuse, suggest that gambling
may be related to other psychiatric and medical disorders”). The DSM’s inclusion is probably
not the only factor contributing to the dramatic surge in gambling-disorder research: it should
come as no surprise that the growth of gambling research has run alongside significant
expansions in the gambling industry, as legalization has increased both the variety and
availability of gambling activity. Howard J. Shaffer & David A. Korn, Gambling and Related
Mental Disorders: A Public Health Analysis, 23 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 171, 171, 174–75
(2002).
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addiction. Both the DSM-III and its successor, the DSM-IV, did not
label pathological gambling as an addictive mental disorder, but
classified the condition in a general category of “impulse control
86
disorders not elsewhere classified.” In addition to gambling disorder,
87
this catchall category included kleptomania, intermittent explosive
88
89
90
disorder, pyromania, and trichotillomania. Like the DSM-III, the
DSM-IV grouped all of these listed impulse-control disorders by a
common “failure to resist an impulse . . . to perform an act that is
91
harmful to the person or to others.” The DSM-IV distinguished
these impulses to act—which result from the “increasing sense of
tension or arousal” preceding the performance of a compulsive act—
from the “pleasure, gratification, or relief” experienced by an
92
individual after acting on that impulse. The DSM-IV classified
pathological gambling by its essential diagnostic feature of “persistent
and recurrent maladaptive gambling behavior . . . that disrupts
93
personal, family, or vocational pursuits.”
2. Reclassification of Gambling as an Addictive Disorder Under
the DSM-5. Critics of the classification of compulsive gambling under
the DSM-III and DSM-IV claimed that “compulsive gambling” was a
misnomer and that the categorization of pathological gambling as an
impulse-control disorder—that is, as a compulsion—was a
94
misconception. Although addictions often involve compulsive
85. See, e.g., Michael Walker, The Medicalisation of Gambling as an “Addiction”, in
GAMBLING CULTURES: STUDIES IN HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION 223, 223 (Jan McMillen
ed., 1996) (arguing that the understanding of “heavy gambling [as] pathological is recent in
origin . . . , that a pathology of gambling as an addiction has not been demonstrated, and that the
similarities between drug addiction and heavy gambling are overstated”).
86. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 671 (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV]; DSM-III, supra note 83.
87. Kleptomania manifests in an individual stealing things. DSM-IV, supra note 86, at 667.
88. Intermittent explosive disorder manifests in frequent emotional outbursts of anger or
rage. Id. at 663.
89. Pyromania manifests in an individual setting fires. Id. at 669.
90. Trichotillomania manifests in an individual pulling his or her own hair out. Id. at 674.
91. Id. at 663.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 671.
94. Lesieur & Rosenthal, supra note 84, at 6–7; see NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMM.
ON THE SOC. & ECON. IMPACT OF PATHOLOGICAL GAMBLING, PATHOLOGICAL GAMBLING: A
CRITICAL REVIEW 11–12, 20, 23–24 (1999), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/
NBK230630/pdf/TOC.pdf (“[F]or most researchers and many clinicians, the notion of
compulsive gambling as a description of pathological gamblers is a technical misnomer.”
(citation omitted)).
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behaviors, they can be distinguished from purely compulsive
96
disorders.
Under the DSM-5, compulsions are defined as “repetitive
behaviors or mental acts that an individual feels driven to perform in
response to an obsession or according to rules that must be applied
97
rigidly.” Compulsive behaviors are not only involuntary, but are also
“ego-dystonic,” meaning that the afflicted individual views her
98
behavior as alien or foreign. For example, an individual with
obsessive-compulsive disorder may be driven to frequently wash his
99
hands with a precise number of strokes each time. Though
performing this hand-washing ritual provides relief from his
psychological discomfort, it does not provide pleasure, and can be
100
ultimately construed as “unwilling.” This can be directly contrasted
with the “ego-syntonic” and even pleasure-producing natures of
101
addictive behaviors.
Diagnostically speaking, impulse-control disorders—the category
that until recently included pathological gambling—can be even
102
further differentiated from addiction. Impulse-control disorders not
only feature compulsive behaviors, but do so in a specific context.
Under the DSM-5, impulse-control disorders are “unique” due to
their tendency to “manifest[] in behaviors that violate the rights of
others . . . and/or bring the individual into significant conflict with

95. See Edmund Henden, Hans Olav Melberg & Ole Jørgen Røgeberg, Addiction: Choice
or Compulsion?, 4 FRONTIERS IN PSYCHIATRY, Aug. 2013, at 9 (applying a dual-process
analysis of compulsion in addiction); Nora D. Volkow & Joanna S. Fowler, Addiction, a Disease
of Compulsion and Drive: Involvement of the Orbitofrontal Cortex, 10 CEREBRAL CORTEX 318,
318 (2000) (proposing that in addition to disrupting traditional reward circuits, “the addictive
state also involves disruption of circuits involved with compulsive behaviors and with drive”).
96. See Grant et al., supra note 78, at 234 (contrasting addiction with obsessive-compulsive
disorder).
97. DSM-5, supra note 11, at 235.
98. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMM. ON THE SOC. & ECON. IMPACT OF
PATHOLOGICAL GAMBLING, supra note 94, at 24; Grant et al., supra note 78, at 234.
99. See DSM-5, supra note 11, at 237 (listing “[r]epetitive behaviors (e.g. hand washing . . .)
or mental acts (e.g. . . . counting . . . )” as one of the diagnostic criteria of obsessive-compulsive
disorder).
100. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMM. ON THE SOC. & ECON. IMPACT OF
PATHOLOGICAL GAMBLING, supra note 94, at 24.
101. Id.; see FERENTZY & TURNER, supra note 80, at 39 (“Drugs, alcohol, and gambling all
provide a person with an opportunity for pleasure, so a pleasure principle is likely involved in
the addiction.”). This is not to say that addicts experience pleasure at every stage of the
addiction, but only that the original motivation can be pleasure-seeking.
102. See DSM-5, supra note 11, at 461.
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societal norms or authority figures.” Furthermore, impulse-control
disorders are believed to be tied to the personality dimension of
104
disinhibition and most frequently emerge during childhood.
In contrast to impulse-control disorders, gambling disorder
closely resembles addictive disorders like alcoholism and drug
105
The DSM-5 reflects this characterization, removing
abuse.
106
pathological gambling from the group of impulse-control disorders.
In place of pathological gambling, the DSM-5 creates a newly named
“gambling disorder,” which is located in a new category of
107
“Substance-Related and Addictive Disorders.” This new category
combines all of the conditions previously classified as “substancerelated disorders,” such as alcohol and drug dependency, with
108
addiction-based disorders, such as gambling disorder.
The
American Psychiatric Association’s (APA’s) decision to craft this new
category was a significant step in recognizing gambling disorder not as
109
a compulsion or an impulse-control disorder, but as an addiction.
As the APA explained, this change “reflects the increasing and
consistent evidence that . . . gambling . . . activate[s] the brain reward
system with effects similar to those of drugs of abuse” and that the
symptoms of gambling disorder and substance-use disorders are
110
similar in nature.

103. Id.
104. Id. at 461–62.
105. Id. at 481.
106. See id. at 461–80 (describing the category of “[d]isruptive, impulse-control, and conduct
disorders” without including gambling-related conditions).
107. Id. at 585. It should be noted that the DSM-5’s reclassification of gambling disorder was
met with some resistance. See Constance Holden, Behavioral Addictions Debut in Proposed
DSM-V, 327 SCIENCE 935 (2010) (“[P]roposed revisions for [DSM-5] include for the first time
‘behavioral addictions’—a change some say is long overdue and others say is still premature.”).
Critics of gambling addictions argue, among other things, that the view of gambling as an
addiction relies on an incomplete account of the evidence, that the pathology of gambling
addictions has not been demonstrated, and that similarities between drug addiction and heavy
gambling are overstated. See, e.g., Varpu Rantala & Pekka Sulkunen, Is Pathological Gambling
Just a Big Problem or Also an Addiction?, 20 ADDICTION RES. & THEORY 1, 1 (2012) (“The
question is whether these new addictions are real psycho-social phenomena, or merely external
social constructions to medicalise these problems.”).
108. DSM-5, supra note 11, at 481–82.
109. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, HIGHLIGHTS OF CHANGES FROM DSM-IV-TR TO DSM-5, at
16 (2013), available at http://www.dsm5.org/Documents/changes%20from%20dsm-ivtr%20to%20dsm-5.pdf.
110. Id.
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C. Gambling Disorder Under Scientific Addiction Models
In order to understand how gambling disorder may operate as an
addictive disorder, it is necessary to become familiar with the
psychological field’s prevailing models of addiction. Research on
substance-related addiction has revealed a “cluster of cognitive,
behavioral, and physiological symptoms” whose interaction helps
explain how an addiction persists despite its detrimental effect on the
111
life of the addict. These physiological symptoms involve intricate
neurological mechanisms that stimulate and reinforce addictive
behavior. For example, the APA has noted an underlying change in
the brain’s circuitry that accompanies the development of a
112
substance-related addiction, and researchers using neuroimaging
technology have found similarities in the neurocircuitry of individuals
with behavioral addictions and those with substance-abuse
113
disorders. Although scientists have backed away from using the
classical neurobiological model—that is, that addiction is solely
driven by neurotransmitted “rewards”—they believe that the
“rewards” provided by chemical neurotransmitters like dopamine and
serotonin nevertheless play an important role in dependence and
114
withdrawal. Thus, although scientists still do not fully understand
the neurological basis of gambling, new evidence suggests that the
neurotransmitter activity of gambling addicts is similar to the kind
115
observed in other addicts. At the end of the day, “as far as the brain
is concerned, a reward’s a reward, regardless of whether it comes
116
from a chemical or an experience.”
Behavioral symptoms of an underlying gambling addiction are
117
manifestations of the roles that operant conditioning and classical
111. DSM-5, supra note 11, at 483.
112. Id.
113. Grant et al., supra note 78, at 236.
114. Judson A. Brewer, Marc N. Potenza & Jon E. Grant, The Neurobiology of Pathological
Gambling, in RESEARCH AND MEASUREMENT ISSUES IN GAMBLING STUDIES 345, 346–54
(Garry Smith, David C. Hodgins & Robert J. Williams eds., 2007).
115. See Grant et al., supra note 78, at 235 (“A growing body of literature implicates
multiple neurotransmitter systems . . . [which] may contribute significantly to both sets of
disorders.”); see also Jakob Linnet, Neurological Underpinnings of Reward Anticipation and
Outcome Evaluation in Gambling Disorder, 8 FRONTIERS BEHAV. NEUROSCIENCE, Mar. 2014,
at 1 (“Gambling disorder is associated with dysfunctions in the dopamine system.”).
116. Constance Holden, “Behavioral” Addictions: Do They Exist?, 294 SCIENCE 980, 980
(2001).
117. Operant conditioning, or instrumental learning, focuses on how behavior can be
changed through the use of positive reinforcement and negative reinforcement delivered after a

WADE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

1/26/2015 11:39 PM

GAMBLING DISORDER UNDER THE ADA
118

965

119

play in forming addictions.
Viewing gambling
conditioning
disorder through the lens of operant conditioning, gamblers are
positively reinforced when they realize financial gains from their
120
gambling, and negatively reinforced when they continue to gamble
as a coping mechanism to ignore negative feelings of stress, anxiety,
121
guilt, and depression. From a classical perspective, environmental
stimuli like the lights and sounds of a slot machine may create mental
122
associations with gambling that reinforce participation. Therefore,
as a result of classical conditioning, the slot-machine player, upon
entering the casino and approaching the chosen slot machine,
123
anticipates and begins to crave the rush he or she feels at each spin.
And while playing, as a result of operant conditioning, the slotmachine player’s wins and losses provide enough of a reward to
stimulate the player to continue playing in anticipation of a future
124
reward. The gambling addict’s responses to both the visual stimuli

specific behavioral response. See J.E.R. Staddon & D.T. Cerutti, Operant Conditioning, 54 ANN.
REV. PSYCHOL. 115, 116 (2003) (discussing the use of “reinforcement schedules” in operant
conditioning).
118. Classical conditioning, also called Pavlovian conditioning, relies on the use of “neutral
or arbitrary cues” over time to elicit certain behaviors, like the well-known story of the dog
salivating when it hears a bell. Michael Domjan, Pavlovian Conditioning: A Functional
Perspective, 56 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 179, 180 (2005).
119. See Amy L. Milton & Barry J. Everitt, The Persistence of Maladaptive Memory:
Addiction, Drug Memories and Anti-Relapse Treatments, 36 NEUROSCIENCE &
BIOBEHAVIORAL REVS. 1119, 1120–25 (2012) (discussing the Pavlovian and instrumental
associations underlying drug addiction).
120. It may seem counterintuitive, but the sporadic nature of gambling wins may provide
stronger reinforcement than steady wins over time. See Christopher D. Fiorillo, Philippe N.
Tobler & Wolfram Schultz, Discrete Coding of Reward Probability and Uncertainty by
Dopamine Neurons, 299 SCIENCE 1898, 1901 (2003) (finding that “sustained, uncertaintyinduced increase in dopamine could act to reinforce risk-taking behavior”); Peter Shizgal &
Andreas Arvanitogiannis, Gambling on Dopamine, 299 SCIENCE 1856, 1858 (2003) (examining
the Fiorillo study, supra, and its potential implications for gambling-behavior theorists).
121. Contrary to popular misconception, “negative reinforcement” in the field of operant
conditioning is not synonymous with “punishment.” See Jack Michael, Positive and Negative
Reinforcement, 3 BEHAVIORISM 33, 37–38 (1975) (discussing misinterpretations of Skinner’s
terminology). Instead, it refers to the removal of an aversive stimulus. Id. Therefore, negative
reinforcement encourages the performed behavior by creating a positive result through the
subtraction of a negative condition. Id.
122. See generally NATASHA DOW SCHÜLL, ADDICTION BY DESIGN: MACHINE GAMBLING
IN LAS VEGAS (2012) (providing an in-depth look at how casinos design environmental stimuli
to maximize time spent on a slot machine or other gambling device).
123. Id. at 49–50 (recounting one gambler’s experience trying to avoid his regular slot
machine in the casino).
124. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
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and the game’s reinforcement mechanisms are behavioral symptoms
of addiction.
Research indicates that gambling disorder and substance-abuse
125
disorders may share certain cognitive features. The primary—and
unique—cognitive mechanism that drives gambling disorder,
however, is the role that irrational belief plays in maintaining the
126
addiction. Gamblers’ predominant irrational belief is the “illusion of
control” present when the gambler believes that his skill plays a role
127
in determining the outcome of a game of chance. Therefore, even
when the slot-machine player loses, he may analyze the patterns of
slot-machine results to predict future wins or become reassured of a
128
future win by the thought that he was “so close” to the jackpot.
Despite the objective reality that the player lacks control over the slot
machine’s draws, the player’s irrational belief attributes a sort of logic
129
and strategy to the game, even when neither exists. Therefore, even
after losing, he will continue to play, believing that winning will come
soon based on his analysis of the patterns and perceived “near
130
miss.”
The interaction of these physiological, behavioral, and cognitive
mechanisms can be demonstrated through different models of
addiction. The simplest model of addiction is the traditional model,
which has three elements: a form of dependence, a progression or

125. Grant et al., supra note 78, at 235 (“Both pathological gamblers and individuals with
substance use disorders typically discount rewards rapidly and perform disadvantageously on
decision-making tasks such as the Iowa Gambling Task, a paradigm that assesses risk-reward
decision making.” (footnotes omitted)).
126. Cristina Orgaz, Ana Estevez & Helena Matute, Pathological Gamblers Are More
Vulnerable to the Illusion of Control in a Standard Associative Learning Task, 4 FRONTIERS
PSYCHOL. 1, 1–2 (2013), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3683617/pdf/
fpsyg-04-00306.pdf.
127. Id.; see Luke Clark, Bettina Studer, Joel Bruss, Daniel Tranel & Antoine Bechara,
Damage to Insula Abolishes Cognitive Distortions During Simulated Gambling, 111 PROC.
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 6098, 6100–02 (2014) (describing how the “gambler’s fallacy” functions, and
suggesting that the gambler’s fallacy is attributable to activity in the brain’s insular cortex).
128. R.L. Reid, The Psychology of the Near Miss, 2 J. GAMBLING STUD. 32, 32 (1986),
available at http://www.stat.berkeley.edu/~aldous/157/Papers/near_miss.pdf.
129. See Chrisi Lambos & Paul Delfabbro, Numerical Reasoning Ability and Irrational
Beliefs in Problem Gambling, 7 INT’L GAMBLING STUD. 157, 168 (finding through empirical
analysis that an increase in levels of irrational belief corresponds to an increase in the frequency
of gambling among participants more closely than to an increase in numerical reasoning
abilities).
130. See Reid, supra note 128, at 32 (“In [gambling], the occurrence of a near miss may be
taken as an encouraging sign, confirming the player’s strategy and raising hopes for future
success.”).
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increase in activity over time, and withdrawal symptoms during
131
periods without the substance or behavior. A common illustration
132
of the traditional model of addiction is the slot-machine player. An
individual player may form a dependence on the activity of machine
133
gambling. Once this dependence has formed, the player’s level of
activity increases over time: the player may start to gamble more
134
frequently, or the player may raise the stakes in play. Withdrawal
symptoms are evidenced when the player’s attempts to cut back on
gambling cause him or her to experience negative feelings like anxiety
135
or irritability.
The slightly more nuanced “components” model of addiction has
six elements: salience, mood modification, tolerance, withdrawal,
136
conflict, and relapse. There is significant overlap among the
elements of the components model and the traditional model. The
first element of the components model, salience, focuses on how
important the behavior becomes to the individual, based on the
notion that addictive behaviors often overshadow the importance of
137
all other activities. The hypothetical slot-machine player may begin
to value his time gambling above all other areas of his life, including
family, friends, employment, and personal well-being. The second
element of the components model, mood modification, specifies the
change in feelings an individual experiences when engaging in an

131. See COLLINS, supra note 81, at 358–59 (“[There are] three key requirements for an
addiction: some form of dependence, progression, and withdrawal symptoms in the absence of
the drug or behaviour.”).
132. The slot-machine player is an appropriate example to demonstrate addiction models
because the models’ predictions most likely mirror reality for a number of gambling addicts
dependent on slot machines. See generally SCHÜLL, supra note 122 (discussing gambling
addiction among gambling-machine players).
133. See id. at 190 (relating the story of gambling-machine addict Patsy: “[w]hen I wasn’t
playing . . . my whole being was directed to getting back into that zone”).
134. See id. at 107 (quoting a gambling-machine player: “I keep needing more intensity, and
the machines keep matching me”).
135. See id. at 210 (quoting machine gambler Randall relating how he would “get disgusted
with [himself] playing that little machine . . . but the fact is, I always went and played anyway.”);
id. at 215 (quoting another machine gambler, Isabella, who tried to stop gambling, but would
“get so bothered by the machines when [getting] baby formula at the store” that she would try
to ignore them, “but it [didn’t] always work”).
136. See generally Mark Griffiths, A ‘Components’ Model of Addiction Within a
Biopsychosocial Framework, 10 J. SUBSTANCE USE 191 (2005) (offering what the author
believes are components of addiction: “salience, mood modification, tolerance, withdrawal,
conflict, and relapse”).
137. Id. at 193.
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138

addictive behavior—colloquially referred to as a “rush” or a “high.”
The mood-modification element might indicate why the slot-machine
player may have turned to gambling in the first place: playing the
slots may provide the player with an escape from stress, sadness, and
139
other negative feelings.
The tolerance element explains why a player feels he must
increase or intensify his gameplay; as the player continues the activity
over time, an increasing amount of the activity is needed to achieve
140
The component model’s
the same mood-modification effect.
withdrawal element closely adheres to the traditional model’s concept
of withdrawal—where the gambler experiences negative symptoms
141
during attempts to curb his behavior. Withdrawal symptoms range
from the psychological—for example, moodiness and irritability—to
142
the physiological—such as nausea, headaches, and insomnia.
Conflict, an element added by the components model, refers to the
“interpersonal conflict” that can occur as the player’s relationships
become strained due to his diverted attention or increased stress, or
143
as his finances dwindle due to the costs of significant game play. The
conflict element can also refer to “intrapsychic conflict” as the slot144
machine player struggles internally about his behavior. Finally, the
negative feelings caused by attempts to quit or reduce the level of
gambling might eventually lead to the final element of relapse—a
145
return to the slot machines.
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE ADA’S EXCLUSION OF GAMBLING
ADDICTION AS A DISABILITY
This Note proposes that Congress amend the ADA provision
excluding compulsive gambling as a disability to allow the recognition
of gambling disorder. First, inclusion of the newly classified gambling
disorder is in line with the spirit of the ADA. Second, the exclusion of
138. Id.
139. See Richard T.A. Wood & Mark D. Griffiths, A Qualitative Investigation of Problem
Gambling as an Escape-Based Coping Strategy, 80 PSYCHOL. & PSYCHOTHERAPY 107, 114 (“[A
gambling] buzz could be perceived as relaxing by filling time, avoiding boredom and/or shifting
focus away from life’s problems . . . .”).
140. Griffiths, supra note 136, at 194.
141. Id. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
142. Griffiths, supra note 136, at 194.
143. Id. at 195.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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gambling disorder as a disability stymies the expected role that
diagnostic and scientific texts like the DSM play in the legal process.
Third, the exclusion as currently interpreted creates loopholes in
cases of comorbidity that might make it harder for gambling addicts
with other conditions protected under the ADA to succeed in
employment-discrimination claims.
A. The Spirit of the ADA
Upon its enactment, the ADA was touted as a “comprehensive
bill” that would “extend civil rights protections to 43 million disabled
146
persons in the United States.” Lawmakers went so far as to call the
147
bill “an emancipation proclamation for persons with disabilities.”
The National Council on Disability, which had played a crucial role in
the passage of the ADA, remarked that “[f]uture generations [would]
148
look back on the passage of the ADA as a watershed public policy.”
It is indisputable that the ADA has achieved much in the way of
integration and antidiscrimination for individuals with disabilities in
149
the United States.
Despite its initial fanfare, however, the ADA has failed to
completely live up to the expectations of its creators. Current
critiques of the ADA can be divided into three categories: criticism
that views the statute as “poorly written and structurally flawed,”
criticism “that the ADA has been betrayed by judicial backlash,” and
criticism “that disability-based workplace accommodations are
150
inefficient and create disincentives to employing disabled persons.”
The problems presented by the ADA are likely caused by some
151
combination of all three criticisms. Whatever the case may be, the

146. 135 CONG. REC. S17,559 (1989).
147. 136 CONG. REC. S17,369 (1990) (statement of Sen. Harkin).
148. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, Foreword, July 26, 1997 to EQUALITY OF
OPPORTUNITY: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (1997), available at
http://www.ncd.gov/publications/1997/equality_of_Opportunity_The_Making_of_the_American
s_with_Disabilities_Act.
149. See, e.g., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Expanding Opportunity in the Community for People with
Disabilities, ADA.GOV, http://www.ada.gov/disability-rights-accomplishments.htm (last visited
Jan. 23, 2015) (listing accomplishments in public accommodation, civic participation, and ADA
enforcement by DOJ’s Civil Rights Division from 2009−2012).
150. Michael Ashley Stein, Michael E. Waterstone & David B. Wilkins, Cause Lawyering
for People with Disabilities, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1658, 1659 (2010).
151. For a more in-depth discussion of the issue of judicial backlash to broad readings of the
ADA, see infra Part IV.B.
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scope of the ADA’s coverage is dramatically narrower than
152
lawmakers seem to have envisioned.
Although Congress received praise for passing what seemed like
an evenhanded law, in the reality of the courtroom, plaintiffs bringing
ADA claims face an uphill battle. Defendants have largely prevailed
against ADA claims in the courts, winning dismissals, summary
153
judgments, verdicts, and appeals at high rates. Challengers bringing
winning claims under the ADA remain a distinct minority. A 2006
study revealed a plaintiff success rate of less than 3 percent in all Title
154
I claims.
These numbers are surely disappointing for lawmakers and the
estimated forty-three million Americans with disabilities they sought
155
to protect. For these forty-three million individuals, the ADA was
intended to “break down these barriers [to communicating,
156
commuting, or entering the workplace] once and for all.” Based on
recent estimates, the number of Americans with a disability has
157
grown to 56.7 million. To be sure, not all individuals with disabilities
have cause to seek remedy in the courts, so low plaintiff success rates
alone do not show that the ADA has failed. But, as of 2007, the
ADA’s protections are estimated to cover fewer than 13.5 million

152. See S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy, Something Borrowed, Something Blue: Why Disability
Law Claims Are Different, 33 CONN. L. REV. 603, 605 (2001) (“These laudable goals [of the
ADA] have yet to be realized. Ten years after the enactment of the ADA, studies have shown
that people with disabilities continue to see virtually the same disadvantages in the labor market
that they experienced prior to the enactment of the ADA.”).
153. Eliza Kaiser, The Americans with Disabilities Act: An Unfulfilled Promise for
Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 735, 739 (2004). “[B]etween
1992 and 1998, plaintiffs won in only 6% of the cases at the trial court level.” Id.; see Ruth
Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 99, 100 (1999) (“[D]efendants prevail in more than ninety-three percent of reported ADA
employment discrimination cases . . . .”); Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 239, 277 (2001) (finding that as an empirical
matter “defendants are much more likely than plaintiffs to prevail in appellate litigation”).
154. See Amy L. Albright, 2006 Employment Decisions Under the ADA Title I—Survey
Update, 31 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 328, 328 (2007) (“Of the 218 [Title I]
decisions [in 2006] that resolved the claim (and have not yet changed on appeal), 97.2 percent
resulted in employer wins and 2.8 percent in employee wins.”).
155. 135 CONG. REC. S17,559 (1989).
156. Id.
157. MATTHEW W. BRAULT, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: 2010, at 4 (2012), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/p70-131.pdf. This estimate, excluding institutionalized
individuals, equals 18.7 percent of the civilian population. Id.
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158

Americans. Therefore, millions of disabled individuals, whom
Congress described as “the real champions of [the ADA]” and
159
instructed “to never allow their vigil to wane,” have not realized the
benefits that Congress promised in passing the ADA.
This shortcoming is no reason to throw out the entire ADA,
which has accomplished or made great strides toward many of
160
Congress’s original goals. Rather, the underperformance should
incite lawmakers to reexamine the ADA’s current coverage.
Amending the ADA to remove the exclusion of compulsive gambling
would be a significant improvement for individuals with gambling
disorder because such a recognition of their condition would crack
open, however slightly, the gate to the ADA, which is currently shut
by the Act’s definition of disability.
B. The Role of the DSM-5
161

The DSM is not just a scientific text; it has also long been a
162
“primary authority for the legal community.” Though the DSM’s
163
authority is neither absolute nor incontrovertible, the publication
has been “elevated . . . to the level of de facto legal treatise” among
164
employment lawyers. Even though the DSM-5 adds a cautionary
statement that “[i]n most situations, the clinical diagnosis of a DSM-5
mental disorder . . . does not imply that an individual with such a
condition meets legal criteria for the presence of a mental disorder or
165
a specified legal standard,” diagnoses based on the DSM frequently

158. Ruth Colker, The Mythic 43 Million Americans with Disabilities, 49 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1, 7 (2007). And in Colker’s estimation, “those [13.5 million] individuals [are] typically . . .
so disabled that they are not qualified to work even with reasonable accommodations.” Id.
159. 136 CONG. REC. 9684-03 (daily ed. July 13, 1990) (statement of Sen. John McCain).
160. See generally U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, ENFORCING THE ADA: LOOKING BACK ON A
DECADE OF PROGRESS (2000), available at http://www.ada.gov/pubs/10thrpt.pdf (highlighting
the ADA’s achievements).
161. The DSM plays an important role in the medical and psychiatric communities, and its
“criteria for diagnosis provide a common language among clinicians,” ensuring accuracy and
consistency across practitioners. REILLY & SMITH, supra note 33, at 1.
162. Hass, supra note 83, at 683.
163. Id. at 689 (“[T]he DSM-IV is simply a consensus-built medical text with the attendant
limits. It is not a psychiatric ‘bible.’” (footnotes omitted)).
164. Id. at 685.
165. DSM-5, supra note 11, at 25; see Osika v. Bd. of Educ., No. 98 C 5953, 1999 WL
1044838, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 1999) (“The issue is not whether depression and other mental
and emotional disorders are ‘impairments’ within the purview of the ADA. They certainly are.
. . . Suffering from a medical condition that is listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
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play a role in the legal determination of the existence of a mental
166
167
disorder, such as the establishment of disability in ADA cases. In
fact, the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) has pointed to the DSM as a source that can be used in
identifying the types of mental disorders cognizable under the
168
ADA. Notwithstanding the uncertainty surrounding the possible
effects of a new edition, as courts begin to hear testimony from
experts relying on the DSM-5, the DSM-5’s extensive revisions have
the potential to drive parallel changes in several areas of the law,
169
including employment discrimination.
The changes from previous editions in the DSM-5 would support
the ADA’s recognition of gambling addiction as a disability. The
original categorization of compulsive gambling in the ADA’s list of
excluded conditions mirrors the DSM-IV’s list of “impulse control
170
disorders not elsewhere classified.” In both the ADA and the DSMIV, gambling sits alongside its familiar bedfellows, pyromania and
171
kleptomania.
In the DSM-5, however, gambling disorder is
172
distanced from those conditions through the use of different
diagnostic criteria and is associated instead with substance-related
disorders that currently fall squarely under the protection of the

(DSM), however, is not dispositive to the legal inquiry of whether a plaintiff is protected by the
ADA.”).
166. RALPH SLOVENKO, PSYCHIATRY IN LAW/LAW IN PSYCHIATRY 161 (2d ed. 2009).
167. Jules L. Smith, Understanding How To Apply the DSM-IV to a Case Under the ADA,
17 LAB. LAW. 449, 455 (2002); see also Schwartz v. Comex, No. 96 CIV. 3386 LAP, 1997 WL
187353, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 1997) (noting that the DSM “offers some guidance” on what
the plaintiff’s claimed disability of paranoid-thought disorder was). Note that the DSM’s
diagnostic criteria do not always support the ADA’s definition of disability. See Brown v. N.
Trust Bank, No. 95 C 7559, 1997 WL 543098, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 2, 1997) (holding that because
the plaintiff’s DSM diagnosis was a single episode of depression, her impairment was temporary,
and thus not a disability under the ADA).
168. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 62, at 2–3 (recognizing the DSM “as
an important reference by courts . . . widely used by American mental health professionals”).
169. For an example of how changes in previous editions of the DSM have changed courts’
construction of existing law, see Alan Stone, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and the Law:
Critical Review of the New Frontier, 21 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 23, 23 (1993) (“No
diagnosis in the history of American psychiatry has had a more dramatic and pervasive impact
on law and social justice than PTSD.”).
170. DSM-IV, supra note 86, at 671.
171. Compare id. (recognizing pathological gambling, kleptomania, and pyromania as
impulse control disorders), with 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(2) (2012) (excluding “compulsive
gambling, kleptomania, or pyromania” from ADA coverage).
172. Compare DSM-5, supra note 11, at 476, 478 (listing diagnostic criteria for pyromania
and kleptomania, respectively), with id. at 585 (listing diagnostic criteria for gambling disorder).
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173

ADA. Therefore, it seems arbitrary to exclude one DSM-classified
addiction from ADA coverage but allow ADA protection for the
others.
Changes to the DSM classification of gambling disorder,
however, are not enough to bring gambling disorder under the
ADA’s protections. Compulsive gambling is explicitly excluded from
coverage in the ADA, and without a statutory amendment, the newly
branded gambling disorder is almost certainly excluded as well. The
DSM-5’s classification of gambling disorder as an addiction cannot
simply be judicially incorporated into the ADA because judges, no
matter how creative, are limited in their powers of statutory
interpretation. The court’s inability to recognize gambling disorder as
a disability cuts against the drafters’ concern that the ADA’s
definition of disability must be flexible enough to encompass “new
174
disorders [that] may develop in the future.” Given the weight of the
DSM’s authority in proving mental disorders in conjunction with the
DSM’s newly recognized gambling disorder, the ADA should be
amended to remove its outdated exclusion of “compulsive gambling.”
C. Comorbidity Loopholes
The current exclusion creates further potential problems in
ADA cases involving comorbid conditions that in some circumstances
create loopholes for employers to discriminate against individuals
with both ADA-recognized disabilities and ADA-excluded comorbid
conditions. Comorbidity occurs in individuals who have two or more
175
coexisting medical conditions. Comorbid conditions in an individual
might be causally linked or otherwise associated, or they might be

173. See Dovenmuehler v. St. Cloud Hosp., 509 F.3d 435, 439 (8th Cir. 2007) (“Drug
addiction that substantially limits one or more major life activities is a recognized disability
under the ADA.”); Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 896 (9th Cir. 2002) (same); Bailey v. Ga.Pac. Corp., 306 F.3d 1162, 1167 (1st Cir. 2002) (“There is no question that alcoholism is an
impairment for the purposes of the first prong of analysis under the ADA.”).
174. S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 20 (1989).
175. See Carrie N. Klabunde, Joan L. Warren & Julie M. Legler, Assessing Comorbidity
Using Claims Data, 40 MED. CARE IV-26, IV-26 (2002) (“Comorbidities are additional diseases
beyond the condition under study.”); Ismene L. Petrakis, Gerardo Gonzalez, Robert Rosenheck
& John H. Krystal, Comorbidity of Alcoholism and Psychiatric Disorders, 2 ALCOHOL RES. &
HEALTH 81, 81 (2002), available at http://pubs.niaaa.nih.gov/publications/arh26-2/81-89.pdf
(defining comorbidity as a “dual diagnosis”).
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entirely unrelated; all that is required for conditions to be considered
176
comorbid is that an individual have both at the same time.
Comorbidity rates are especially high in cases involving gambling
disorder, meaning that individuals with a gambling disorder are likely
177
to also have other physical or mental conditions. Separate studies
have found comorbidity overlap between gambling disorder and sleep
178
179
180
disorders, substance abuse and alcoholism, and depression, as
181
was the case for John Trammell. Though comorbidity rates do not
necessarily indicate any causal links between gambling disorder and
the other conditions, they do demonstrate an appreciable chance that
an individual diagnosed with gambling disorder might have another
182
medical condition. And, unlike gambling disorder, the potential

176. See M. Grabicki, H. Parysek, H. Batura-Gabryel & I. Brodnicka, Comorbidities as an
Element of Multidimensional Prognostic Assessment of Patients with Chronic Obstructive
Pulmonary Disease, 59 J. PHYSIOLOGY & PHARMACOLOGY 297, 298 (2008) (dividing discussed
comorbidities into categories including “comorbid diseases with a common pathophysiology,”
“conditions that arise as a complication” of the primary condition, and “co-incidental
comorbidities with unrelated pathogenesis”).
177. See Angela Ibáñez, Carlos Blanco, Elizabeth Donahue, Henry R. Lesieur, Igancio
Pérez de Castro, José Fernández-Piqueras & Jerónimo Sáiz-Ruiz, Psychiatric Comorbidity in
Pathological Gamblers Seeking Treatment, 158 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1733, 1734 (2001) (finding a
“high rate and wide range of comorbid psychiatric disorders” among diagnosed pathological
gamblers seeking treatment).
178. Iman Parhami, Aaron Siani, Richard J. Rosenthal & Timothy W. Fong, Pathological
Gambling, Problem Gambling and Sleep Complaints: An Analysis of the National Comorbidity
Survey, 29 J. GAMBLING STUD. 241, 248–50 (2013).
179. See Renee M. Cunningham-Williams, Linda B. Cotter, Wilson M. Compton III &
Edward L. Spitznagel, Taking Chances: Problem Gamblers and Mental Health Disorders—
Results from the St. Louis Epidemiologic Catchment Area Study, 88 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1093,
1093 (1998) (finding problem gamblers “at an increased risk for several psychiatric diagnoses,
especially . . . alcoholism[] and tobacco dependence”); Gladys W. Hall, Nicholas J. Carriero,
Ruby Y. Takushi, Ivan D. Montoya, Kenzie L. Preston & David A. Gorelick, Pathological
Gambling Among Cocaine-Dependent Outpatients, 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1127, 1127 (2000)
(finding a higher prevalence of pathological gamblers among cocaine-dependent outpatients as
compared with the general population); Tony Toneatto & Judy Brennan, Pathological
Gambling in Treatment-Seeking Substance Abusers, 27 ADDICTIVE BEHAV. 465, 465 (2002)
(finding high rates of gambling problems among treatment-seeking substance abusers); see also
NANCY M. PETRY, PATHOLOGICAL GAMBLING: ETIOLOGY, COMORBIDITY, AND TREATMENT
21, 86 (2005) (summarizing a number of studies, including those listed above).
180. See Sidney H. Kennedy et al., Frequency and Correlates of Gambling Problems in
Outpatients with Major Depressive Disorder and Bipolar Disorder, 55 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 568,
568 (2010) (finding that people with depression have higher rates of gambling).
181. See Trammell v. Raytheon Missile Sys., 721 F. Supp. 2d 876, 882–83 (D. Ariz. 2010).
182. Comorbidity and Gambling Disorders Fact Sheet, NAT’L CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE
GAMING, http://www.ncrg.org/sites/default/files/oec/pdfs/ncrg_fact_sheet_comorbidity.pdf (last
visited Jan. 23, 2015) (citing survey data finding that “96.3 percent of the lifetime pathological
gamblers also met lifetime criteria for one or more other psychiatric disorders”).
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comorbid conditions have been found by courts in some cases to
183
qualify as disabilities under the ADA.
Serious legal complications can arise when an individual bringing
a case for disability discrimination under the ADA suffers from a mix
of potentially cognizable conditions, like depression, and certainly
excluded conditions, like gambling disorder. John Trammell’s case
serves as a stark illustration of these complexities. Although
Trammell’s depression could meet the requirements of a disability,
184
his claim on that basis was ultimately rejected. A prima facie case
185
under Title I requires employer knowledge of the condition.
Because his employer, Raytheon, had no knowledge of his
186
depression, Trammell’s depression claim hit a fatal stumbling block.
On the other hand, Raytheon undoubtedly had knowledge of
Trammell’s gambling problems because Trammell had discussed
them with the human-resources department. But Trammell was
187
barred from bringing such a claim under the ADA. Instead,
Trammell was forced to take a roundabout approach, arguing that his
gambling addiction was a manifestation of his depression—an
188
allowable underlying disability. This argument was summarily
189
rejected. If Trammell’s gambling disorder could have been a
cognizable disability under the ADA, the result might have been
190
different.
Comorbidity rates among gambling addicts provide potential
loopholes, making it easier for employers to discriminate against
individuals with disabilities. Taking the illustration a step beyond the
facts of the Trammell case, what if the employer had knowledge that
an employee was suffering from both depression and gambling
disorder? Because gambling-disorder claims are excluded, the
employer might have been able to fire the doubly afflicted employee
for the explicitly stated reason that the employee was a gambling
183. See, e.g., Duggins v. Appoquinimink Sch. Dist., 921 F. Supp. 2d 283, 290 (D. Del. 2013)
(recognizing that the plaintiff’s severe depression qualified as a disability under the ADA).
184. Trammell, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 882–83.
185. See AMS. WITH DISABILITIES: PRACTICE & COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 7:391 (2014)
(“Consistent with the requirement to show or suggest that the adverse employment action was
taken for prohibited reasons, an employee making a prima facie case must show that the
employer knew, or should have known, of the disability.”).
186. Trammell, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 877.
187. Id. at 882–83.
188. Complaint, supra note 24, at 2.
189. Trammell, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 877.
190. For a further discussion, see infra Part V.
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addict. Even if the employee’s protected disability played a role in the
termination decision, the employer could potentially use the excluded
gambling disorder as a defensive bar to defeat the employee’s claim.
The size and significance of this identified loophole depends
heavily on whether mixed-motive analysis applies to ADA Title I
claims. Mixed-motive analysis excuses defendants from liability for
employment decisions in which discrimination against a protected
status played a motivating part only if the defendant can prove that it
would have made the same decision in the absence of the plaintiff’s
191
protected status. This would effectively allow the aforementioned
doubly afflicted employees to argue that their employers terminated
them for their (unprotected) gambling addiction and their other
protected disability. But currently, the question of whether mixedmotive analysis applies in the ADA context is unresolved. Mixed192
motive claims are allowed in Title VII discrimination cases. Claims
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, however, are not
193
subject to mixed-motive analysis. Based on Gross, some courts have
determined that mixed-motive analysis does not apply to ADA
194
claims. Nevertheless, mixed-motive analysis is not an easy hurdle to
clear. Therefore, whatever the status of mixed-motive analysis, the
current ADA exclusion of gambling disorder either makes it
extremely difficult or virtually impossible for gambling addicts to
bring any otherwise-winning claim under the ADA.
IV. POTENTIAL DIFFICULTIES IN RECOGNIZING GAMBLING
ADDICTION AS A DISABILITY
Even if the disability status of gambling addicts under the ADA
is reexamined, several factors pose challenges to the likelihood of
reform. This Part first discusses how social moralism and the
marginalization of addiction may prevent widespread popular
acceptance—and perhaps more relevantly, lawmakers’ acceptance—
of gambling addiction as a “real” mental disorder. Next, it examines
how courts have demonstrated a willingness to impose a narrow view
of the definition of disability under the ADA. Finally, this Part
considers how the proposed amendment can address employer
191. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989).
192. Id.
193. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs. Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 172 (2009).
194. Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 318 (6th Cir. 2012) (en banc);
Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 962 (7th Cir. 2010).
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concerns about potential risks and burdens imposed by protecting
gambling addicts in the workplace.
A. Social Moralism and the Marginalization of Addiction
The concepts of disease and disability are normative, meaning
195
that both can be defined as deviations from the social mean. But in
the determination of what deviations count as “disabilities” under the
ADA, public opinion and social values play a large role in
196
categorization. Therefore, the ADA (and this Note’s proposed
amendment) serves not only as a reflection of shifting social norms,
but also as an embodiment of what society deems worthy of
197
protecting. As Senator Harkin stated:
There is a wellspring of fears and unfounded prejudices about
people with disabilities, unfounded fears, whether people have
mental disorders, whether they are manic depressives or
schizophrenia or paranoia, or unfounded fears and prejudices based
upon physical disabilities. The point of the bill is to start breaking
down those barriers of fear and prejudice and unfounded fears, to
get past that point so that people begin to look at people based on
198
their abilities, not first looking at their disability.

Though the ADA was intended to fight myths and stereotypes
199
associated with disability, its strategy for accomplishing this goal
was selective. Instead of putting forth a welcome mat to all people
with disabilities, the ADA underlined the bias society has toward
200
those with mental disorders listed as sin exceptions, “carv[ing] out a
new class of untouchables” defined by their socially repugnant
201
behavior, like excessive gambling.

195. Adrienne L. Hiegel, Sexual Exclusions: The Americans with Disabilities Act as a Moral
Code, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1451, 1451 (1994).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1452.
198. 135 CONG. REC. 19,866 (1989).
199. See supra notes 40–47 and accompanying text.
200. See 42 U.S.C. § 12211 (2012) (listing compulsive gambling and other “conditions” like
homosexuality, bisexuality, transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism,
gender-identity disorders, other sexual-behavior disorders, kleptomania, pyromania, and
psychoactive-substance-abuse disorders resulting from the illegal use of drugs).
201. Hiegel, supra note 195, at 1453.
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Today, gambling addicts continue to face multiple layers of social
202
203
stigma: stigma against disabilities, stigma against mental illnesses,
and stigma against gambling itself. Gambling has been called a
“classic vice[]”—an activity traditionally viewed as morally
condemnable that has undergone some level of legalization in our
204
society. Gambling is often seen as a personal moral failing whose
blame lies solely on the individual: “Within western cultures, useful
employment, family life and the acquisition of material wealth are
central goals of the sociali[z]ation process. The heavy gambler is seen
205
as a failure by these standards.”
Before the development of modern psychiatry, gambling-related
206
problems were often classified as a form of “moral insanity.”
Despite the removal of “moral insanity” from the psychiatric
207
208
lexicon, morality-based objections to excessive gambling persist.
Not only has this stigma slowed widespread social acceptance of
gambling addiction as a legitimate mental disorder, but it has also
209
played a role in slowing scientific research into the topic. Thus,
although the scientific community changed its conception of gambling
from “gambling as sin” to “gambling as sick,” alongside its acceptance
210
of the psychoanalytic perspective on human nature,
societal
acceptance still lags behind. The persistent lack of public acceptance

202. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability”, 86 VA. L. REV.
397, 401 (2000) (noting that individuals with disabilities tend to experience social disadvantages
and deprivation of opportunities).
203. See also Elizabeth F. Emens, Disabling Attitudes: U.S. Disability Law and the ADA
Amendments Act, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 205, 208 (2012) (“When the conversation turns to people
with cognitive or psychosocial (psychiatric) disabilities, however, then the whole person is
tainted, discredited . . . .”).
204. John Dombrink, Gambling and the Legalisation of Vice: Social Movements, Public
Health, and Public Policy in the United States, in GAMBLING CULTURES, supra note 85, at 43.
The other “classic vices” listed include “abortion, homosexuality, drug use, pornography, and
prostitution.” Id.
205. Id.
206. COLLINS, supra note 81, at 366–71.
207. Lucy Ozarin, Moral Insanity: A Brief History, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS (May 18, 2001),
http://psychnews.psychiatryonline.org/newsArticle.aspx?articleid=103040.
208. One author has even argued that the diagnostic criteria of pathological gambling in the
DSM-IV themselves represented a medicalization of researchers’ previous moral objections to
gambling behavior. Bo J. Bernhard, The Voices of Vices: Sociological Perspectives on the
Pathological Gambling Entry in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 51
AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 8, 9 (2007).
209. Id. at 11 (“[C]onservative moral forces have exerted subtle but powerful influences
over academic inquiry.”).
210. Walker, supra note 85, at 223–24.
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has kept gambling disorder in the shadows, and can affect lawmakers
to the extent that they share these same views or that the lack of
public acceptance obscures the issue as one requiring legal protection.
Amidst the fight against the forces of social moralism, the
growing marginalization of the very idea of addiction presents
another barrier to ADA recognition of gambling addiction. In his
examination of addiction, Jim Orford recognized “the danger of
triviali[z]ing the debate about addiction if the concept is extended too
211
far.” Addiction has been absorbed into the popular vernacular as a
term meant to refer to nothing more than frequent use or enjoyable
212
habits. The boundaries between conceptions of noncompelled
frequent use and true addiction are easily blurred in the public eye.
The difficulties of separating these conceptions of “addiction” arise
because behavioral addictions involve problems of self-control, which
213
are well within the dimension of normal human functioning. By
contrast, true addicts experience impaired self-control at a level
214
beyond what an average person might experience. What might seem
to external viewers as a voluntary, and therefore blameworthy,
215
activity is in fact the result of a mental disorder.
References, often made tongue-in-cheek, to addictions to
216
217
218
shoes, Netflix, and Diet Coke appear to contribute to the
marginalization of gambling addiction by creating the perception that
211. JIM ORFORD, EXCESSIVE APPETITES: A PSYCHOLOGICAL VIEW OF THE ADDICTIONS
5 (2d ed. 2001). In a broader vein, we might even encounter the argument against including
addictions under ADA coverage—that doing so would trivialize and overextend the concept of
disabilities.
212. See infra notes 216–18 and accompanying text.
213. MARK DICKERSON & JOHN O’CONNOR, GAMBLING AS AN ADDICTIVE BEHAVIOUR:
IMPAIRED CONTROL, HARM MINIMISATION, TREATMENT AND PREVENTION 22 (2006); see
FERENTZY & TURNER, supra note 80, at 39 (“It is helpful . . . to view addictions as extensions of
normal human behaviors and aspirations—natural functions gone awry.”).
214. See DICKERSON & O’CONNOR, supra note 213, at 22.
215. Though the author was describing a narcotics user, this quote from William S.
Burroughs’s novel Junky seems illustrative: “The question is frequently asked: Why does a man
become a drug addict? The answer is that he usually does not intend to become an addict. You
don’t wake up in the morning and decide to be a drug addict.” WILLIAM S. BURROUGHS, JUNKY
4–5 (1952).
216. Rachel Holmes & Malgorzata Stankiewicz, Shoe Addiction, What’s the Cure?,
GUARDIAN (Apr. 15, 2010, 6:26 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2010/apr/15/
shoe-addiction-cure.
217. Felice Shapiro, Confessions of a Netflix Addict, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 18, 2013, 7:52
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/felice-shapiro/netflix_b_4112820.html.
218. Arielle Calderon, 25 Signs You’re Addicted to Diet Coke, BUZZFEED (Apr. 30, 2013,
3:44 PM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/ariellecalderon/signs-youre-addicted-to-diet-coke.
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addictions are banal peccadilloes, rather than serious psychiatric
disorders. This marginalization is especially disastrous to the
credibility of behavioral addictions, which already run against the
norm of substance-based addictions. Instead of expanding society’s
conception of the varied types of addictions, these references would
219
likely fall into what Orford would consider “too far,” and increase
the risk that excessive-gambling behavior will be associated with
overindulgences in shoes or Netflix, rather than understood as a true
addiction.
B. Courts’ Narrow Interpretation of the ADA
The courts’ narrow interpretation of the ADA is widely
220
acknowledged. Congress likely intended the ADA to incorporate
the relevant case law developed under its predecessor, the
221
Rehabilitation Act. This hope failed to materialize in subsequent
222
court decisions. Instead, the Supreme Court interpreted the ADA’s
definition of disability in a way that, according to critics, was contrary
223
to the ADA’s intent. These cases, most notably Sutton v. United Air
224
Lines, Inc. and Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v.
219. ORFORD, supra note 211, at 5.
220. See Barry, supra note 55, at 206 (“In fact, the narrowing of coverage under the ADA is
used in law schools across the country as a textbook example of how language intended by
Congress to mean one thing can be interpreted by courts to mean something completely
different.”).
221. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701–718 (2012); 29 C.F.R. § 1630, app. (2015);
see 154 CONG. REC. S18,517 (2008) (statement of Sen. Tom Harkin) (“When Congress passed
the ADA . . . it adopted the functional definition of disability from [] Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 . . . . Within this framework, with its generous and inclusive
definition of disability, courts treated the determination of disability as a threshold issue but
focused primarily on whether unlawful discrimination had occurred.”).
222. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630, app. (“The holdings of several Supreme Court cases sharply
narrowed the broad scope of protection Congress originally intended under the ADA, thus
eliminating protection for many individuals whom Congress intended to protect.”).
223. See, e.g., Michael Waterstone, The Untold Story of the Rest of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1807, 1815 (2005) (“This narrow construction of the
definition of disability, commentators suggest, has contributed to plaintiffs’ low success rates in
ADA cases, which has in turn limited the ADA’s effectiveness (particularly Title I). An
undercurrent running through much of this scholarship is the sense among commentators that
the judiciary is generally hostile to the ADA.” (footnote omitted)); see also NAT’L COUNCIL ON
DISABILITY, RIGHTING THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 1 (2004), available at
http://www.ncd.gov/publications/2004/Dec12004 (“[T]he provisions of the ADA that have been
narrowed by Court rulings currently do not provide the same scope of opportunities and
protections expressed by those involved in the creation and passage of the ADA. Legislation is
urgently needed to restore the ADA . . . .”).
224. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
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225

Williams, significantly narrowed the protections of the ADA by
setting stringent requirements for plaintiffs alleging disability. For
example, the Court in Sutton considerably narrowed the meaning of
226
“substantially limits.” Recall that the ADA’s definition of disability
requires that the claimed impairment “substantially limit” a “major
227
life activity.” In determining the meaning of “substantially limits,”
the Court in Sutton required a plaintiff who claimed that her disability
substantially limited her ability to work to demonstrate that she was
“unable to work in a broad class of jobs,” rather than demonstrate
that her condition substantially limited her ability to work in her
228
particular job. Two years later in Toyota Motor, in determining
what constituted a “major life activity,” the Court limited acceptable
activities to those “tasks that are of central importance to most
people’s daily lives,” rather than activities specific to the life of the
229
individual claiming a disability. In doing so, the Court held that the
terms “substantially” and “major” “need to be interpreted strictly to
create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled” under the
230
ADA.
The precedents that sprouted after the ADA’s enactment
became so restrictive that Congress sought to reopen and broaden the
231
statute by passing the ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA) in 2008.
The ADAAA was intended to “reinstat[e] a broad scope of
232
protection under the ADA,”
partly by including rules of
construction “in favor of expansive coverage to the maximum extent
233
permitted by the terms of the ADA.” In passing the ADAAA,
Congress forcefully rejected the Court’s holdings in Sutton and
234
Toyota Motor. In what appears to be a targeted response to courts’
narrowing of the ADA’s definition of disability, the ADAAA’s
implementing regulations included a reminder that “the primary
object of attention [in ADA cases] should be . . . whether

225. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2001).
226. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491.
227. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2012).
228. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491.
229. Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 187.
230. Id. at 197.
231. Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122
Stat. 3553 (2012) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012)).
232. 29 C.F.R. § 1630(c)(4) (2015).
233. 29 C.F.R. § 1630, app. (2015).
234. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A) (2012).
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discrimination has occurred, not whether the individual meets the
235
definition of disability.”
236
The ADAAA became effective January 1, 2009, and the
237
EEOC issued its final implementing regulations on March 25, 2011.
But as of the date of this Note’s publication, the results of the
ADAAA have not proven the legislation to be an effective solution
to the ADA’s problems, and some scholars doubt that the ADAAA
238
will have any effect on court decisions. At the heart of this criticism
lies a fundamental shared assumption: despite their robes, judges are
people, and the same social attitudes that stigmatize some disabilities
can also play a role in judges’ rulings on the bench. As one
commentator argues:
Attitudes to disability determined the fate of the ADA in the nearly
twenty years between its passage and its restoration. It was largely
attitudes—specifically, the gap between societal attitudes and the
law’s demands—that led to the narrowing of the statute in the
239
courts.

The continued judicial contraction of the ADA’s application to
plaintiffs with drug addictions and alcoholism has particularly
problematic implications for gambling addiction. Some of this narrow
interpretation derives from the terms of the statute itself. The statute
does not protect any individual “currently engaging in the illegal use
240
of drugs.” But an individual successfully rehabilitated and “no
longer engaging in the illegal use of drugs” could arguably be a
241
qualified individual with a disability. In any case, employers are free

235. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(c)(4) (“The question of whether an individual meets the
definition of disability under this part should not demand extensive analysis.”).
236. Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008, § 8.
237. Regulations To Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with
Disabilities Act Amendments Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,977 (Mar. 25, 2011) (codified at 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630).
238. See, e.g., Emens, supra note 203, at 207–08 (“What will happen as more courts interpret
it? My guess is that attitudes to disability will largely determine the courts’ interpretations. . . . I
suspect that courts will find new ways to narrow the statute . . . .”).
239. Id. at 206.
240. 42 U.S.C. § 12114(a); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.3 (2015) (“The term ‘currently engaging’ is
not intended to be limited to the use of drugs on the day of, or within a matter of days or weeks
before, the employment action in question. Rather, the provision is intended to apply to the
illegal use of drugs that has occurred recently enough to indicate that the individual is actively
engaged in such conduct.”).
241. 42 U.S.C. § 12114(b)(1). But see Tyson v. Or. Anesthesiology Grp., P.C., Civ. No. 031192, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44992, at *19 (D. Or. June 6, 2008) (“ADA coverage [is] not
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to prohibit their employees from using or being under the influence
242
of illegal drugs and alcohol while at the workplace. Even in such
narrow circumstances, courts have been reluctant to allow ADA
claims on the basis of alcoholism and drug addictions, relying on
243
extremely narrow interpretations of the ADA. This trend is
particularly troublesome for individuals with gambling disorder. Even
if gambling disorder is recognized as an allowable disability under
Title I, courts may prove similarly hesitant to allow ADA claims in
gambling-disorder cases by setting high bars for the plaintiff to
establish that his or her impairment substantially limited a major life
activity.
C. Employer Concerns
Some employers may resist the recognition of gambling disorder
as a cognizable disability because it might prevent those employers
from exercising their discretion to create safe and dependable
workforces. After all, the ADA imposes not only negative obligations
244
on employers to refrain from discriminating based on disability, but
also affirmative obligations to provide reasonable accommodation in
245
the workplace. Therefore, employers might be worried about the
difficulty of complying with a new requirement to provide reasonable
246
accommodation to gambling addicts. Additionally, employers may
present various reasons against the hiring of problematic gamblers,
including unreliability and absenteeism caused by gambling binges

triggered automatically when plaintiff [is] released from his rehabilitation treatment” because
“employers are also entitled to assurances that the employee is refraining from the continued
illegal use of drugs and the impacts of that use.”). Even individuals whose drug-related
disabilities qualify under this provision are subject to additional restrictions under 42 U.S.C.
§ 12114(c)(4) regarding their job performance.
242. 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(1)–(2).
243. See, e.g., Shirley v. Precision Castparts Corp., 726 F.3d 675, 679 (5th Cir. 2013)
(interpreting the ADA term “current use of drugs” to include drug use in preceding weeks and
months); Mauerhan v. Wagner Corp., 649 F.3d 1180, 1189 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding that the
plaintiff, who had not used drugs for one month, was still a current drug user); Bailey v. Ga.Pac. Corp., 306 F.3d 1162, 1168−69 (1st Cir. 2002) (characterizing the plaintiff’s difficulties at
work as “isolated problems” and rejecting his claim of alcoholism as a disability); Burch v.
Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 315 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding that the plaintiff’s alcoholism did not
impair any major life activity).
244. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012).
245. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
246. See generally Carrie Griffin Basas, Back Rooms, Board Rooms—Reasonable
Accommodation and Resistance Under the ADA, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 59 (2008)
(advocating for the involvement of individuals with disabilities in the accommodation process).
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and the potential of theft or embezzlement to pay off gambling
247
debts. Finally, employers may fear that if gambling addiction is
recognized as a disability, they might face lawsuits for refusing to
employ individuals that they believe, based on the individuals’
gambling activities, might pose a high risk to the employers’ business
interests.
At first glance, it may seem that the ADA’s provisions offer no
protection against these employers’ concerns. However, employers
have a number of protections under the ADA, the best known of
which is the “direct threat” defense, which allows employers to fire or
refuse to hire individuals if the employers determine that the
248
individuals pose a threat to workplace safety and health. The
dangers facing employers of gambling addicts largely fall outside the
“direct threat” defense, however, as they generally do not involve the
potential for physical harm and safety hazards that the defense
249
envisions.
Nevertheless, even if ADA cases involving gambling addiction
are treated similarly to cases involving addictions recognized under
ADA case law, current ADA provisions provide a potential remedy
for many of the employers’ concerns. First, although employers may
worry about the types of reasonable accommodation the ADA would
mandate they provide to employees with gambling addictions,
reasonable accommodation is restricted according to its feasibility:
the employee’s request for accommodation must be “reasonable on
250
its face.” Furthermore, the employee—the potential plaintiff—bears
the burden of demonstrating the reasonableness of his or her own

247. See Todd Etshman, Employers Need To Know Warning Signs of Fraud, ROCHESTER
BUS. J., (May 2, 2014), available at http://www.rbj.net/article.asp?aID=208286 (“The majority of
frauds we investigate are because people have a gambling problem and steal from their
employer to gamble.”).
248. See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2012) (“The term ‘qualification standards’ [that an employee
must meet] may include a requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the
health or safety of other individuals in the workplace.”); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(2) (2015)
(same).
249. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (2015) (“Direct Threat means a significant risk of substantial
harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by
reasonable accommodation . . . . In determining whether an individual would pose a direct
threat, the factors to be considered include: (1) The duration of the risk; (2) The nature and
severity of the potential harm; (3) The likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and (4) The
imminence of the potential harm.” (emphasis in original)).
250. See US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 402 (2002) (holding that the plaintiff
needed to demonstrate that the accommodation “seem[ed] reasonable on its face, i.e., ordinarily
or in the run of cases”).
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251

request. In all cases, an employer is entitled to claim a defense of
“undue hardship” when accommodation requests are too expensive
252
or difficult to provide. This determination of undue hardship takes
into account considerations of the employer’s size, financial
253
resources, and business needs.
Therefore, despite employers’
bemoaning of the difficulty of designing accommodations for
gambling addicts, actual accommodations would most likely include
only flexible scheduling and time off from work to participate in
rehabilitation (as is the case for alcoholics and drug addicts in
recovery).
Furthermore, employers’ obligation under the ADA to provide
reasonable accommodation has not proved especially burdensome.
At the outset of the enforcement of the ADA, the EEOC projected
that the reasonable-accommodation provision would create the lion’s
254
share of employers’ expenses resulting from the statute. Still, initial
255
estimates of those potential costs were quite low. Since then, the
Job Accommodation Network (JAN), a service provided by the U.S.
Department of Labor, has annually released findings on the costs and
256
benefits of job accommodations under the ADA. In its most recent
release, JAN reported its finding that “[m]ost employers report no
257
cost or low cost for accommodating employees with disabilities.”
The most likely accommodations sought by gambling addicts might
be time off from work to enter into a rehabilitation program or
flexible scheduling to allow attendance at group-therapy meetings,
both of which already function as reasonable accommodation for
258
other addictive disorders under the ADA. Therefore, employers’
251. Id.
252. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(B)(5)(A) (2012).
253. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B) (2012).
254. Equal Employment Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 8578,
8582 (Feb. 28, 1991).
255. Id. at 8582–84 (calculating that the mean for various estimates would be $261).
256. For the most recent report, see generally JOB ACCOMMODATION NETWORK,
WORKPLACE ACCOMMODATIONS: LOW COST, HIGH IMPACT (2013), available at
http://askjan.org/media/LostCostHighImpact.doc.
257. Id. at 4. Of the employers providing information to JAN, 58 percent reported that the
necessary accommodation for their employees cost nothing, and of those who did report some
cost, the median cost of a one-time accommodation was $500. Id.
258. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (“The term ‘reasonable accommodation’ may include . . .
modified work schedules . . . .”). This accommodation would be analogous to workplace
accommodation sought by employees with other addictive disorders, like alcoholism. See
Schmidt v. Safeway, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 991, 996 (D. Or. 1994) (holding that the employer must
provide a leave of absence for an employee to obtain medical treatment for alcoholism).
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concerns over the burden and expense of providing accommodations
under the ADA seem largely overstated. Furthermore, employers are
permitted to hold employees with drug or alcohol addictions to the
259
same qualification and performance standards as nonaddicts. It is
therefore plausible that employees with gambling disorder could be
placed under the same standards as other employees or potential
employees. For example, a gambling addict who frequently misses
work to attend horseraces or go to the casino should not be able to
claim an exemption from workplace-attendance policies by alleging
that his addiction caused his absences.
Lawmakers should keep in mind, though, that employers’ stated
concerns are not always borne out by reality. Even though individuals
struggling with gambling addiction may have personal problems,
these problems do not always translate into poor job performance.
For example, in John Trammell’s case, despite the frequency of his
habits and the severity of his casino debts, he received
overwhelmingly positive employment reviews before his
260
termination.
Fundamentally, employers want a productive
workforce, and even those individuals with gambling disorder, if
given the right workplace accommodations to seek treatment, can
ultimately become valuable employees.
V. WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN FOR JOHN TRAMMELL: A
COUNTERFACTUAL CASE ANALYSIS
In light of these suggestions and considerations, one might
consider how John Trammell’s Title I discrimination claim might
have played out in court if the ADA definition of disability had not
excluded compulsive gambling. As Trammell attempted to show for
his depression, he would have to present a prima facie case that he
has a disability, he is a qualified individual, and he was subject to an
adverse employment action by his employer because of his
261
disability.
259. 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(4) (2012); see Salley v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 160 F.3d 977, 981
(3d Cir. 1998) (disallowing a Title I claim in which the plaintiff claimed that he was late to work
and left work early due to his drug use); see also Zenor v. El Paso Healthcare Sys., Ltd., 176
F.3d 847, 856–57 (5th Cir. 1999) (suggesting factors courts can examine, “including the level of
responsibility entrusted to the employee; the employer’s applicable job and performance
requirements, the level of competence ordinarily required to adequately perform the task in
question, and the employee’s past performance record” (quotation marks omitted)).
260. Complaint, supra note 24, at 2.
261. AMS. WITH DISABILITIES: PRACTICE AND COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 7:391 (2014).
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A. Establishing a Disability
Under the first element of his prima facie case, Trammell would
try to characterize his gambling disorder as a mental impairment
262
under § 12102(1)(A). Gambling disorder is diagnosable as a mental
263
or psychological disorder under the DSM-5. Recall, however, that a
mental impairment alone is not enough to establish a disability—the
impairment must also “substantially limit[] one or more major life
264
activities[.]” Trammell could conceivably make an argument that his
gambling disorder substantially limited a number of the qualifying life
activities listed in 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2), including sleeping, eating,
thinking, and concentrating. This argument could have been
supported by expert evidence from his psychiatrist, who prepared an
affidavit attesting that Trammell’s impairment substantially limited
major life activities because it caused “ongoing severe feelings of
sadness, problems with insomnia, decreased appetite, decreased
265
energy level, and severe anxiety regarding finances.”
B. Qualified Individual
If Trammell cleared the initial hurdle of pleading a disability, he
would next have to show he is a qualified individual—that is, “an
individual who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can
266
perform the essential functions” of his job. During his time at
267
Raytheon as a senior manager, Trammell received overwhelmingly
268
positive employment reviews before his termination. However, he
had recently been confronted at work about his gambling problem
and had been intending to ask for professional counseling at the time
269
he was fired by Raytheon. Would seeking that treatment have
262. Although arguments could also be made for Trammell’s disability under the second
and third prongs of the ADA’s definition of disability, because this Note has focused exclusively
on the first prong, this hypothetical will likewise focus on how Trammell could bring his case
under the first prong.
263. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. Even though Trammell was technically
diagnosed with the definition of pathological gambling under the DSM-IV in place at the time
of his case, this thought experiment will use the current diagnostic language and refer to
gambling disorder. See Affidavit of Bradley R. Johnson, M.D., supra note 27, at 2 (diagnosing
pathological gambling as a disorder).
264. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (2012).
265. Affidavit of Bradley R. Johnson, M.D., supra note 27, at 2.
266. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2012).
267. Complaint, supra note 24, at 2.
268. Id.
269. Trammell v. Raytheon Missile Sys., 721 F. Supp. 2d 876, 877 (D. Ariz. 2010).
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transformed him into a “disqualified” individual? More likely than
not, if Trammell had sought temporary inpatient treatment for a
gambling disorder or outpatient meetings with a psychiatrist or
counselor, his scheduling request would have fallen under Raytheon’s
270
obligation to reasonably accommodate disabled employees.
C. Adverse Employment Action
Under the third element, because Raytheon fired him, Trammell
would have little difficulty proving the occurrence of an adverse
271
employment action. But the latter half of this element—whether he
was fired because of his disability—would likely be the most difficult
burden for Trammell’s prima facie case. Could Trammell prove that
Raytheon’s decision to fire him was based on his disability? The
advantage here, in contrast to Trammell’s real case, is that Trammell
alleged that he informed Raytheon’s human-resources officer and
272
security manager about his gambling habits. In fact, it was the
human-resources officer who asked Trammell if he needed
273
professional counseling.
Raytheon’s knowledge of Trammell’s
condition removes the major stumbling block in his depression-based
274
disability claim. Trammell would still have to jump through all the
hoops of the typical plaintiff bringing a Title I claim under the ADA,
but at least in this counterfactual, he has the same chance of getting
his foot through the courtroom door as would a similarly situated
person with a currently cognizable disability.
CONCLUSION
Although the ADA provision denying Title I coverage to
employees claiming compulsive gambling as a disability remains the
law, the underlying reasons for this exclusion are now in doubt.
Changing scientific understandings have shaken the foundation upon
which scientists have defined addiction, expanding the notion of
addiction beyond the traditional realm of substance dependencies to
270. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (“The term ‘reasonable accommodation’ may include . . .
modified work schedules . . . .”); Schmidt v. Safeway, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 991, 996 (D. Or. 1994)
(holding that the employer must provide a leave of absence for an employee to obtain medical
treatment for alcoholism).
271. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012) (“No covered entity shall discriminate against a
qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to . . . discharge of employees . . . .”).
272. Trammell, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 881.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 882.
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encompass behavioral dependencies as well. If not for the explicit
exclusion contained in the ADA, gambling addiction would seem to
fit into the definition of disability that includes alcoholism and drug
addiction. Nevertheless, although scientific development allows for
evolving understandings, the legal standard of disability is stymied by
the text of the ADA.
The recent inclusion of gambling disorder in the DSM-5 poses a
ripe opportunity for the reevaluation of the ADA’s exclusion of
compulsive gambling as a disability. The evolving understanding of
addiction, the ADA’s recognized shortfalls, and the potential for
employers to exploit loopholes caused by the exclusion of gambling
disorder counsel in favor of such a reexamination. Amending the
ADA would not be without challenges. Social attitudes, judicial
resistance, and employers’ reluctance all pose potential obstacles to
the recognition of gambling disorder as a cognizable disability under
Title I. Given the existing statutory barrier, any change in the legal
status of gambling disorder as a disability ultimately requires an
amendment of the ADA that eliminates its current categorical
exclusion. Gathering the necessary legislative momentum to act,
however, may prove the biggest challenge of all.

